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Essay
PAYING FOR SUFFERING: THE PROBLEM OF HUMAN
EXPERIMENTATION
LARRY I. PALMER*
INTRODUCTION
Several years ago, I had the privilege of working with David Feld-
shuh and Daniel Booth, colleagues of mine at Cornell University, in
the production of an educational video, Susceptible to Kindness: Miss
Evers' Boys and the Tuskegee Syphilis Study.' The video examines the eth-
ical issues raised by the infamous experiment, the Tuskegee Study of
Untreated Syphilis in the Negro Male (Tuskegee Study).* David Feld-
shuh's award-winning play, Miss Evers' Boys,3 is a fictionalized account
© Copyright 1997 by Larry I. Palmer.
* Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. A.B., Harvard University; LL.B., Yale Univer-
sity. This Essay is a revision of the 1996 Stuart Rome Lecture on Law and Ethics, delivered
on April 11, 1996 at the University of Maryland School of Law.
On May 16, 1997, President Clinton formally apologized on behalf of the federal gov-
ernment for the Tuskegee Experiment. SeeJohn F. Harris & Michael A- Fletcher, Six De-
cades Later, an Apology: Saying 'I Am Sorry,' President Calls Tuskegee Experiment 'Shameful,'
WASH. POST, May 17, 1997, at Al, available in 1997 WL 10693767. Five of the eight living
victims of the Experiment attended the White House ceremony. See id. The President told
them: "We can stop turning our heads away, we can look at you, in the eye, and finally say,
on behalf of the American people, what the United States government did was shameful,
and I am sorry." Id.
1. SUSCEPTIBLE TO KINDNESS: Miss EvRs' Boys AND THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY
(1994) [hereinafter SUSCEPTIBLE TO KINDNESS].
2. See FINAL REPORT OF THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY AD Hoc PANEL TO THE DEPART-
MENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE (1973) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT OF THE Tus.
KEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY].
The Tuskegee Study of Untreated Syphilis in the Negro Male was a forty-year
study (1932 to 1972) conducted by the United States Public Health Service to
document the long-term effects of syphilis. The study tracked some 400 men
from Macon County, Alabama, by charting their health via annual medical exams
and by performing autopsies on the more than 100 men who died over the course
of the study. The men were never told that they were subjects of a study, nor were
they ever told the exact nature of their disease.
The subjects, mostly tenant farmers in rural Macon County, were originally
gathered to receive free medical treatment.
LARRY I. PALMER, STUDY GUIDE FOR DISCUSSION LEADERS, SUSCEPTIBLE TO KINDNESS: Miss
EvRs' Boys AND THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY (1994) (accompanying the video). For a
detailed account of the study, see JAMES H. JONES, BAD BLOOD: THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS
EXPERIMENT (1993).
3. DAVID FELDSHUH, MIss EvERs' Boys (1995).
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of the Tuskegee Study,4 which was conducted by the United States
Public Health Service from 1932 to 1972. s Daniel Booth, a filmmaker,
created the juxtaposition of selected scenes from a performance of
Miss Evers' Boys at Cornell University, interviews with commentators,
historical film footage, music, and photographs, which became the
"text" of our prize-winning video.6 I was the executive producer and
author of the written study guide that accompanies the video.7 The
educational video and study guide focus on a number of issues, in-
cluding personal and professional ethics, the relationship between law
and medicine, and the social forces of race, gender, and economic
status in shaping what may be right or good when power and authority
are variously defined.'
The selected tide, Susceptible to Kindness, serves as a metaphor for
the human tragedy of the Tuskegee Study. The metaphor comes
from a scene near the end of the play, Miss Evers' Boys, in which Miss
Evers is testifying before a United States Senate Committee consider-
4. The play was inspired by David Feldshuh's reading of Jones's Bad Blood: The Tus-
kegee Syphilis Experiment, JONES, supra note 2, and other primary sources about the Study
during his completion of his residency training in emergency medicine. Feldshuh had
previously earned a Ph.D. in theater. The protagonist of Feldshuh's play, Miss Evers, is
based on a real public health nurse, Eunice Rivers, whose voice and photograph are a part
of the video. See SusCEPTiBLE TO KINDNESS, supra note 1. The other characters in the play
are four African-American tenant farmers; Dr. Douglas, a Caucasian public health physi-
cian; and Dr. Brodus, the African-American head of the hospital at Tuskegee Institute.
FELDSHUH, supra note 3. The play premiered at the Center Stage in Baltimore, Maryland in
November 1989 and has been performed at many theaters throughout the country. Miss
Evers' Boys won the Gerald R. Dodge Foundation's New American Play Award in 1989 and
was nominated for the Pulitzer Prize in 1992. Home Box Office (HBO) produced a film
version of the play, which originally aired on February 22, 1997. The play was first pub-
lished in American Theatre in November 1990. See David Feldshuh, Miss Evers' Boys, 7 AM.
THEATRE, Nov. 1990 (special pull-out section).
5. See FIAL REPORT OF THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY, supra note 2.
6. The video won four awards: a CINE Golden Eagle in 1994 as a "documentary"; a
Gold Plaque Award in the "Politics, Society, and Government" category in the Interna-
tional Communication Film & Video Festival, INTERCOM '94; Best of Category, "Issues
and Ethics" in the International Health & Medicine Film Festival, 1994; and a Silver Apple
in "The Health Issues and Ethics" category in the 1995 National Educational Media
Competition.
7. See PALMER, supra note 2. The text of the study guide was a commentary on the
artistic creation of Daniel Booth. Collaborating with two artists seeking to contribute to
the public discourse on human experimentation required me to use "literary imagination."
See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETicJUSTICE: THE LrrERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE 2-3
(1995) (positing that the imagination writers use to create literature will guide societal
development because their ideas will be read by and affect ihe minds ofjudges, legislators,
and policymakers). As noted in the study guide: "The educational value of Miss Evers' Boys
lies in the intersection between the moral vision within the play and the very strong reac-
tions of those who view the play as a description of social or inner reality." PALMER, supra
note 2, at 3.
8. See PALMER, supra note 2, at 11-20.
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ing legislation concerning research on human subjects.' Justifying
her role in the forty-year Study, Miss Evers declares: "I loved those
men .... [they] were susceptible to kindness.""0
The Tuskegee Study reappears periodically in public discourse,
most recently in 1995 when President Clinton's nominee for Surgeon
General, Dr. Henry Foster, Jr., was alleged to have participated in the
Study." Dr. Foster's critics, and even some scholars, have questioned
whether he knew of the Tuskegee Study when he was a practicing phy-
sician in Tuskegee in 1969. The nagging questions about Dr. Foster
suggest that there are important lessons to learn from reexamining
the Study, even twenty-five years after a panel of experts made recom-
mendations that they believed would prevent future abuses of patients
or subjects.1 2
The Tuskegee Study acts as precedent even though there is no
traditional case law involving the Study.1 Tuskegee's legacy is
9. FELDSHUH, supra note 3, at 93.
10. Id. at 97.
11. See JONES, supra note 2, at 209 (stating that as early as February 1969, during Dr.
Foster's vice presidency of the Macon County Medical Society, the organization voted
unanimously and without comment to refer the Study to the Macon County Health Depart-
ment); Faster Quizzed on Tie to Experiment, COM. APPEAL (Memphis), Feb. 25, 1995, at 2A,
available in 1995 WL 2642106; David L. Kirp, Blood, Sweat, and Tears: The Tuskegee Experiment
and the Era of AIDS, Tlruut, May 1995, at 50, available in 1995 WL 12580337; Lisa Nevans,
Foster Says Race Plays Part in Attacks, Finds Pattern in Opposition, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1995,
at Al, available in 1995 WL 2558782. Although the Family Research Council, based solely
on Jones's account, charged Dr. Foster with knowledge of the Study, a member of the
Council conceded thatJones's book neither places Dr. Foster at that meeting nor claims
that he was aware of the experiments. See Foster Didn't Know Anything About the Tuskegee
Experiment (National Public Radio broadcast, Feb. 25, 1995). Moreover, Fred Gray, attor-
ney for the subjects, has stated that his investigation did not indicate that Dr. Foster had
any knowledge of the Study while it was being conducted. See id.
12. See FINAL REPORT OF THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY, supra note 2, at 23-47.
13. Society seems to have accepted that something "bad" happened during the Tus-
kegee Study, but some scholars have taken great literary license with the facts. For in-
stance,Jack Kevorkian, the outspoken proponent of legalizing physician assistance in dying
and a longtime advocate of allowing experimentation on prisoners condemned to death,
stated the following about the Tuskegee Study:
The wartime medical crimes [referring to the Nazi concentration-camp experi-
ments] were one result. The ethical sickness had spread to the United States
even before World War II, but evidence of it surfaced only after the war, when in
1981 a horrible experiment on syphilis in Tuskegee, Alabama, was described in
detail. It involved a nontherapeutic study of 399 syphilitic black prisoners and 201
uninfected black prisoners who served as "controls." None of the subjects was
asked their consent or knew what was happening.
JACK KEVORKIAN, PRESCRIPTION MEDICIDE: THE GOODNESS OF PLANNED DEATH 170 (1991)
(citations omitted). In his zeal to argue the inadequacy of the modem code of ethics for
human experimentation, Kevorkian might have ignored the difference between tenant
farmers and prisoners in describing what in fact happened in the Tuskegee Study.
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grander because it was a stimulus to the current model of regulating
human experiments-the "institutional review board" 4-and the pre-
vailing model of professional ethics, which is grounded in a subject's
consent.'5 Within this model, monetary compensation is often prof-
fered as a solution after a subject is injured or killed in the course of
human research, 6 or when it is discovered that an individual did not
consent to being the subject of human research.' 7 After a lawsuit was
filed in 1974,18 the federal government agreed to compensate the sub-
jects of the Tuskegee Study. 9 Examining the terms of this settlement
will make society less willing to embrace the concept that paying for
suffering resolves the deep public policy issues that human experi-
mentation presents.
The Tuskegee legacy has also helped to shape the latest govern-
ment report on human experimentation, the Final Report of the Advi-
sory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments."' This Report suggests
Another explanation for the creative license taken with the facts of the Tuskegee
Study is that issues associated with race are easily distorted. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 7, at
93-97 (discussing the effects of a reader's race on his ability to judge Bigger Thomas's
thoughts and actions in Richard Wright's Native Son). Feldshuh, for instance, has men-
tioned in conversations with this Author that he has encountered African-American actors
who have stated categorically that the government actually "gave" syphilis to the tenant
farmers in Macon County.
14. See genera//y 42 U.S.C. § 289 (1994) (providing that any entity applying for a federal
government biomedical research grant for studies that use human subjects must establish a
review board "to protect the rights of the human subjects of such research").
15. See ARTHUR CAPLAN, IF I WERE A RICH MAN COULD I BUY A PANCREAS?: AND OTHER
ESSAYS ON THE ETHICS OF HEALTH CARE 94 (1992) (listing the duties of research institutions
to obtain informed consent from human subjects); JAY KATZ, THE SILEr WORLD OF Doc-
TOR AND PATIENT 59-84 (1984) (discussing the development of informed consent); LARRY I.
PALMER, LAw, MEDICINE, AND SOCAL JusTIcE 43-44 (1989) (discussing the social and legal
importance of informed consent); DAVID J. ROTHMAN, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE: A His-
TORY OF How LAw AND BIoErTHIcs TRANSFORMED MEDICAL DECISION MAMNG 93 (1991)
(describing the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) definition of informed consent
and its historical origins).
16. See Student's Death Is Linked to an Anesthetic, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1996, at B4. A
nineteen-year-old volunteer in a study on the effects of smoking and air pollution died
after an accidental overdose of topical anesthetic during a lung test. See id. The woman's
family said it planned to file a $100 million lawsuit against the hospital. See id.
17. See Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713, 716-18 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (finding
that pregnant women were unknowingly administered diethylstilbestrol (DES) as part of a
university study of the drug's effectiveness in preventing miscarriages).
18. See Plaintiff's Complaint, Pollard v. United States, 384 F. Supp. 304 (M.D. Ala.
1974) (No. 4126-N).
19. SeeJONFS, supra note 2, at 217-19.
20. FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITrEE ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS
(1996).
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that Congress should provide monetary damages to unknowing par-
ticipants in studies conducted over the last fifty years. 1
Given the specifics of the Final Report of the Advisory Committee on
Human Radiation Experiments, it is apparent that the legal response to
the Tuskegee Study provided the Radiation Committee with a frame-
work in which monetarily compensating "victims" of modem medical
progress is accepted as the appropriate governmental response. 22 De-
spite the similarity between the government's response to the Tus-
kegee Study and the Human Radiation Experiments, providing
governmental compensation to victims is only one of several alterna-
tive responses to the persistent public policy problem of human ex-
perimentation.2 1 In fact, other responses must be considered as we
move toward a conceptualization of the appropriate social functions
of science, medicine, and law.
In reviewing the Tuskegee Study for institutional lessons, com-
mentators must resist the prevailing view that the physicians and scien-
tists involved in the Study were bad or even racist; this view blinds
scholars to the ineffectiveness of our present legal response to human
experimentation.24 Although society may not be susceptible to the
kindness of a caring public health nurse such as the fictionalized
Nurse Evers, 21 it may be susceptible to a religious-like faith in medical
progress and legal utilitarianism when confronting human suffering.
26
I. THE TUSKEGEE STUDY- COMPENSATION BY SETTLEMENT
After the Tuskegee Study became the subject of media reports,
Fred Gray, who has had a long history of involvement in civil rights
21. Id. at 512. The Radiation Committee recommended financial compensation for
the subjects (or their surviving immediate family members) for whom the experiments
provided no prospect of direct medical benefit or who had been misled into believing that
controversial interventions were actually standard practice. Id. at 513. Furthermore, the
Committee recommended that the compensation be adequate to cover relevant medical
expenses and associated harms, including pain and suffering, loss of income, and disabil-
ity. Id.
22. See FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS,
supra note 20, at 178-88.
23. See CAPLAN, supra note 15, at 70-99; JAY KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HuMAN BE-
INGS: THE AUTHORITY OF THE INVESTIGATOR, SUBJECr, PROFESSIONS, AND THE STATE IN THE
HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION PROCESS 248-52 (1972); ROTHMAN, supra note 15, at 248.
24. See Statement by Committee MemberJay Katz, FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COM-
MITTEE ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, supra note 20, at 849-56 (criticizing current
regulation of human experimentation); see also PALMER, supra note 2, at 14 (discussing the
need to understand the relationship of health care to economic resources as a means to
avoid "simplistic perspectives on our present health care crisis").
25. FELDSHUH, supra note 3.
26. See CAPLAN, supra note 15, at 243; KATZ, supra note 23, at 598.
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litigation, filed a lawsuit on behalf of the survivors of the Study and
the heirs and representatives of the participants who had since died.28
With the assistance of lawyers from the NAACP Legal Defense Fund,29
Gray named as defendants the United States Government, the United
States Public Health Service, the United States Center for Disease
Control, the United States Department of Health, Education and Wel-
fare, Department officials in their professional capacities, the State of
Alabama, a private foundation, and individual physicians working for
the United States Public Health Service."
The complaint, filed in the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Alabama, alleged that the defendants' conduct vio-
lated the constitutional rights of the survivors and the deceased par-
ticipants in the experiments." The complaint also requested that
each survivor or decedent representative be awarded $1.5 million as
compensation for the deprivation of their constitutional rights.1 2
Gray's legal theory was that the tenant farmers selected for the
Study by the Public Health Service were chosen solely because they
were African American.3 3 As a consequence of this reasoning, Gray
did not name as defendants any of the African-American physicians or
nurses involved in the Study.' Under Gray's conception, the victimi-
zation of these African-American nurses and physicians by a racially
27. Gray is well known as the lawyer who represented Rosa Parks, whose arrest precipi-
tated the Montgomery Bus Boycott in 1955. See Parks v. City of Montgomery, 92 So. 2d 683
(Ala. Ct. App. 1957).
28. See Plaintiff's Complaint, Pollard v. United States, 384 F. Supp. 304 (M.D. Ala.
1974) (No. 4126-N).
29. See id. at 14.
30. See id. at 1-2.
31. See id. at 12.
32. See id. Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking damages for deprivation
of rights under color of law. See Plaintiff's Complaint at 2, Pollard (No. 4126-N).
33. See Plaintiff's Complaint at 10-11, Pollard (No. 4126-N). Paragraph 13 of the Com-
plaint stated:
The subjects of the study were racially selected: only black men were used as
subjects in the study.... Plaintiffs allege that the black subjects were selected and
used in the experiment, a program of controlled genocide solely because of their
race and color in violation of their rights, secured by the Constitution and Laws of
the United States.
Id.
34. Id. at 1. In his book, Bad Blood: The Tuskegee Syphilis Eaerimtnt, JamesJones writes:
The Tuskegee Institute, for which Gray served as the general counsel, was not
named in the suit. Neither was the Veterans Hospital. The local health depart-
ment and the Macon County Medical Society also escaped legal notice. In fact,
no predominantly black institution was named in the suit. The same was true of
individuals; all of the individually named defendants were white. No black physi-
cians were mentioned; neither were any black nurses.
JONES, supra note 2, at 216.
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segregated medical profession and society mitigated their legal culpa-
bility.35 He believed that race had a greater explanatory force than
notions of professionalism, which might have encompassed both the
Caucasian and African-American professionals over the forty-year pe-
riod of the Study. 6 After numerous pretrial maneuvers, the lawyers
for the plaintiffs and the United States Government reached a mone-
tary settlement in which each surviving subject received $37,500, each
heir or representative of a deceased subject received $15,000, each of
the "controls" received $16,000, and the heir or representative of each
control received $5,000 from the $10 million settlement paid by the
federal government.3 7
In retrospect, Gray's theory of racial selection as the starting
point for a legal analysis of human experimentation seems unwise.
His theory fails to account for the importance of institutional arrange-
ments as an explanation of what happened to his clients 3a-the Cau-
casian public health physicians named as defendants in the lawsuit
relied upon African-American physicians to refer syphilitic patients to
the Public Health Service for over forty years.3 9 These African-Ameri-
can physicians should at least be viewed as co-investigators, rather
than as anonymous African-American professionals victimized by "the
system."40 Were any of these local physicians subject to suits for mal-
practice based on their failure to offer penicillin as a treatment option
after it was discovered to be a cure for syphilis?41 Although the "lack
of informed consent doctrine"4" had not yet been developed,43 the
lingering questions about Dr. Foster' and one of Feldshuh's fictional
characters in Miss Evers' Boys, Dr. Brodus,4" help to shed light on how
the dynamics of science and medicine influence professional perspec-
tives on the ethics of using human subjects.
35. SeeJONES, supra note 2, at 216.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 217.
38. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBIC PoLIcY 210-15 (1994) (describing institutional analyses of race-
related issues).
39. SeeJONES, supra note 2, at 114-15, 136-38.
40. See id. at 144-47.
41. See PALMER, supra note 15, at 23 (noting that physicians are bound to treat patients
based upon the level of knowledge, care, and skill of an average physician in similar cir-
cumstances); see also ROTHMAN, supra note 15, at 183 (criticizing the explanation of the
Study's doctors for failing to treat syphilis with penicillin after 1945).
42. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
43. See KATz, supra note 15, at 59-80 (stating that the lack of informed consent doctrine
took form in the late 1950s).
44. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
45. See supra note 4.
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A. Good People, Bad Institutional Arrangements?
In a scene from the play, Miss Evers'Boys, Dr. Brodus, the adminis-
trator and head of the hospital at the Tuskegee Institute, examines
one of the men in the Study-one of Miss Evers' Boys-in 1946 after
penicillin had been discovered.' Both Nurse Evers and Dr. Douglas,
the Caucasian physician from the United States Public Health Service,
are present and participate in various conversations about whether,
after fourteen years, the men should be given the choice of using pen-
icillin for their advanced stages of syphilis.47 On the one hand, Dr.
Brodus is somewhat of a modern hero when he questions Dr. Douglas
about the desirability of allowing the men to decide for themselves
whether to take the risks of using penicillin for their advanced
syphilis.' On the other hand, when he is questioned by Nurse Evers,
Dr. Brodus uses a form of racial and professional paternalism to justify
continuation of the Study without telling the men about the availabil-
ity of penicillin.49 When Nurse Evers pleads on behalf of the tenant
farmers, Dr. Brodus shouts back in anger: "You think you're the only
person who feels? You got your burden and I got mine. You serve the
race in your way. I serve it in mine. I can't rock the boat while I'm
trying to keep a people from drowning."50
It is apparent that Dr. Brodus is concerned about future funding
for his hospital, one of the few resources of modern health care for
African Americans in his community. He is also concerned about his
role as a research scientist to his liberal (by mid-1940s standards) col-
league, Dr. Douglas.51 It is also apparent that Dr. Brodus has a highly
individualistic vision of his social role. While some commentators in
the video, Susceptible to Kindness: Miss Evers' Boys and the Tuskegee
Syphilis Study, see Dr. Brodus as caught up in the system, others sug-
gest that the socioeconomic difference between him-an educated
professional-and the patients-illiterate tenant farmers- prevents
him from seeing the possible harm to the individual patients.52 In
some respects, Drs. Brodus and Douglas are like many modern profes-
sionals-unable to sort out how the mixture of personal and profes-
46. FELDSHUH, supra note 3, at 71-77.
47. Id.
48. Id. act II, sc. vii.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. The fictional Caucasian doctor, Dr. Douglas, was based upon Dr. John Cutler, Pro-
fessor Emeritus at the University of Pittsburgh Graduate School of Public Health and a
physician in the United States Public Health Service from 1947 to 1967. Dr. Cutler served
as one of the commentators in our video. See PALMER, supra note 2, at 22.
52. FELDSHUH, supra note 3, at 97.
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sional ethics, and perhaps professional ambition, influences their
decisions.
The four hundred African-American males involved in the Tus-
kegee Study were originally gathered at the beginning of the Great
Depression to receive free medical treatment for syphilis. 3 The
United States Public Health Service and a private philanthropy cre-
ated a partnership' to bring some measure of health care to rural
African Americans in the then-prevailing practice of fee-for-service
medicine.55 The individual within the Public Health Service who de-
cided that monitoring the men was appropriate once foundation
funds were no longer available is unknown. In the play, Miss Evers'
Boys, Dr. Douglas is at least idealistic in the sense that he tries to save
the treatment program in 1932 after the funds are withdrawn. 6 He is
professionally committed to providing health care services to the most
underserved population of his day.5 For many years, no one among
his professional colleagues questioned the appropriateness of Dr.
Douglas's actions. Although no moral conflict is apparent in Dr.
Douglas's character, if we try to imagine ourselves in a totally segre-
gated society, would any of us necessarily have experienced moral con-
flict at the time?
The fictional Nurse Evers helps us to recall that prior to the dis-
covery of penicillin, syphilis was classified as a "chronic illness."58 At
that time, popular culture had not yet become infused with the mod-
em notion that every human affliction, such as cancer, multiple scle-
rosis, lupus, diabetes, and AIDS, is subject to cure. Currently, new
treatments that prolong life or ameliorate the symptoms of those with
chronic illnesses only reinforce the notion that a cure is just around
the corner. Research on diet, violence among youth, or the Ebola
virus in Zaire only encourages the belief that science can stop these
epidemics and provide solutions to these current plagues.
It would be a mistake simply to focus on Nurse Rivers because of
her continuity with the Tuskegee Study or because her role has been
artistically immortalized through the character of Nurse Evers in Miss
Evers' Boys. Trying to imagine the ethical dilemmas from her perspec-
53. SeeJoNes, supra note 2, at 116-19.
54. In the early 1930s, the Julius Rosenwald Fund provided the funds necessary for
determining whether syphilis was treatable. See id. at 54-60.
55. See id.
56. FELDSHUH, supra note 3, act I, sc. v.
57. African Americans and other minority groups are still underserved by the medical
profession today. See Miriam Komaromy et al., The Role of Black and Hispanic Physicians in
Providing Health Care for Underserved Populations, 334 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1305, 1305 (1996).
58. FELDSHUH, supra note 3, act II, sc. ii.
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tive does, however, shed light on the institutional arrangements
among science, medicine, gender, race, and law over time.
Our ethics-starved modem minds reason that the discovery in the
1940s of penicillin as a cure for syphilis required public health offi-
cials to provide treatment to all of the men in the Tuskegee Study.
For those public health workers who had labored for years to provide
some care to the medically neglected, however, the miracle drug had
yet to be tested in the reality of medical practice in the rural America
of the Deep South-a reality that would today be labeled as a problem
of "access" to health care services. For the public health care workers
servicing a portion of the public not yet infused with the dreams of
scientifically based medicine, the risks of penicillin loomed much
larger than its benefits.59 This wholly paternalistic vision of the profes-
sionals' right to decide the hard ethical questions for "their" patients
was not incompatible with the ethos of the entire profession prior to
the mid-1960s.60
B. Institutional Lessons
The first lesson to learn from the Tuskegee experiment is a cau-
tionary one. Before commending or condemning professional behav-
ior, we should better understand the forces, particularly the
conceptions of knowledge, that drive professional behavior. One of
these forces is the belief that understanding the nature of disease and
its transmission helps determine the optimal use of health resources.6 1
We all benefit from continued drug research; in plain terms, we now
know that penicillin and other antibacterial drugs change the nature
of bacteria, which requires new antibacterial drugs. Today, the meth-
ods for investigating the effectiveness of drugs and disease progression
involve research on viruses, bacteria, and genes using methodologies
that were simply unknown sixty years ago. Research may involve using
certain populations to aid scientists' efforts to isolate the molecular or
genetic nature of breast cancer or alcoholism, for example, or to de-
termine why some isolated populations have certain incidences of dis-
ease.62 Because of the nature of scientifically based medicine,
research involving human subjects will continue.
59. SeeJONES, supra note 2, at 8.
60. See ROTHMAN, supra note 15, at 101-26.
61. See PALMER, supra note 15, at 8.
62. See, e.g.,Jonathan E. Kaplan et al., Workup on the Waoron, NAT. Hisr., Sept. 1984, at
68 (discussing isolated South American natives who apparently are free from cancer and
heart disease); Craig D. Rose, Taking Aim at Asthma Secrets: Sequana, Canadian Team Seeking
to Unlock Genetic Code in Work with Isolated Population, SAN DIEGO UNIoN-TRIB., Sept. 22, 1994,
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Perhaps we have become so accustomed to the possible health
care benefits of genetic research that we sometimes fail to understand
the complex ethical dilemmas associated with modern scientific re-
search. The recently reported higher incidence of diabetes among
African Americans63 led to speculation that there may be a genetic
"cause" of diabetes.64 In our zest to find cures in these discoveries,
alternative explanations-for example, that the high incidence of dia-
betes is due to environmental conditions of the fetus and thus corre-
lates with the mother's social and economic status-are nearly
drowned out of public discourse.6' Compared with the ethical quan-
daries of biotechnological developments, the Tuskegee Study, in ret-
rospect, appears simple.
The other lesson for science and medicine is easy to state, but
difficult to explain. Most scientists and professionals are ambivalent
about the relationship of race to their work. The Tuskegee research-
ers wanted to know if syphilis took a different course in African Ameri-
cans than in Caucasians.' Lurking underneath that line of inquiry
was whether biological differences among races meant that the medi-
cal response to the individual patient should consider this demo-
graphic factor. Lest we label as "racists" the researchers who might
have asked those questions, we should recall how reluctant modem
scientists are to admit that forensic DNA data are kept by race 67 or
at Cl, available in 1994 WL 5443636 (discussing isolated island population with an ex-
tremely high asthma rate).
63. See Sarah L. Roberts, Cracking the Code, DIABETES FoRECAST, Aug. 1994, at 60, 60.
64. Great advancement in the understanding of the genetic nature of diabetes has led
to the production of genetically engineered human insulin. See ROBERT POLLACK, SIGNS OF
LIFE: THE LANGUAGE AND MEANINGS OF DNA 110 (1994). Such advancements, however,
can raise serious concerns:
In the absence of clear legal boundaries, we are at risk of developing a de facto
national eugenics policy after all, not because we wish to identify and then elimi-
nate people as undesirable members of "lesser races," but because some alleles
will be considered undesirable by organizations in a position to limit their
replication.
Id.
65. See id. at 9.
66. SeeJONES, supra note 2, at 27-28.
67. After a DNA sample is obtained and matched to that of a criminal suspect, the final
step in compiling forensic DNA evidence is to determine the statistical probability that the
crime scene sample came from someone other than the suspect. SeeRanajit Chakraborty &
Kenneth Kidd, The Utility ofDNA Typing in Forensic Work, 254 Sci. 1735, 1736 (1991). Each
band in the sample is measured for its frequency of occurrence within a database com-
posed of persons of a given race; these databases are composed of samples from hundreds
of unrelated individuals subdivided by ethnic group, such as Caucasian, African American,
and Hispanic. See People v. Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 736-37 (Ct. App. 1992); People v.
Simpson, No. BA 097211, 1995 WL 313118 (Cal. Super. Ct. LA County 1995); People v.
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that the debate about the social policy implications of race continues
today.6
8
Finally, the Tuskegee experiment sends a clear message to law-
yers: they must become "reflective practitioners"6-active legal
minds that continually question the institutional frameworks that are
brought to problems. 70 Like most lawyers trained in the common law
tradition, Fred Gray, in his representation of those harmed by the
Tuskegee Study, was not equipped with an institutional analysis that
would have allowed him to consider science and medicine as powerful
institutional forces. Gray may not even have considered whether the
growth of medicine and science might require the development of
new legal concepts. He might not, for example, have considered
whether naming individual practicing physicians, who happened to
have been African American, as defendants might have enhanced his
Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 658 (Co. Ct. 1988), aftd, 589 N.Y.S.2d 197 (App. Div. 1992),
affd, 633 N.E.2d 451 (N.Y. 1994).
In 1991, a debate arose-within the scientific community as to whether databases
should be maintained by narrower racial categories. Under the Lewontin and Hard "sub-
structuring" theory, the three broad, homogeneous populations named above do not mate
randomly, influencing their degree of genetic variation. See Richard C. Lewontin & Daniel
L. Hard, Population Genetics in Forensic DNA Typing, 254 Sci. 1745, 1747 (1991). Accord-
ingly, genetic databases of Hispanics, for example, must be subdivided into groups such as
Mexicans and Puerto Ricans. This controversial hypothesis was quickly debunked, see 1A
U.S. DEPr. JUSTICE, FBI REP., VNTR POPULATION DATA: A WORLDWIDE STUDY 2 (1993);
Chakraborty & Kidd, supra, at 1738-39, and abandoned by its original proponents. See
Daniel L. Hard & Richard C. Lewontin, DNA Fingerprinting Report (Letter), 260 Sci. 473
(1993). Citing the FBI study, a California court held that substructuring has a negligible
effect on forensic DNA statistical evidence. See People v. Soto, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 846, 859
(Ct. App. 1994); see also Paul B. Tyler, The Kelly-Frye "General Acceptance" Standard Remains the
Rule for Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 1274, 1288-1300 (1995)
(discussing the debunking of the theory that substructuring affects DNA probability
estimates).
Contrary to its purely scientific facade, the compilation of DNA evidence is prone to
various subjective forces. Determining which racial databases will be used and presented
to juries, based on the probability that the suspect will be of a particular race, involves
speculation and, most likely, social prejudice. See Barry C. Scheck, DNA and Daubert, 15
CAanozo L. REv. 1959, 1964-66 (1994). Further, the laboratory tests themselves are not
foolproof; as many as 1 in 25 "match" reports are false positives. SeeJonathanJ. Koehler,
Error and Exaggeration in the Presentation of DNA Evidence at Tria, 34 JURiMETRICS J. 21, 26
(1993). Nonetheless, a recent Gallup telephone poll suggests that 77% of adults (theoreti-
cally representative of potential jurors) believe that DNA blood tests are "very reliable" or
.somewhat reliable" in matching blood to an individual, and only 8% thought the tests
were "somewhat" or "very unreliable." See Gallup Poll, Survey 9/18/94 to 9/20/94.
68. See, e.g., RICaHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHAR.S MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLI-
GENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994) (discussing the provocative hypothe-
sis on the correlation of race and intelligence).
69. See DONALD SCHON, THE REFLECTrVE PRACTITIONER (1983).
70. See PALMER, supra note 15, at 125-37; Larry I. Palmer, Research with Human Subjects As
a Paradigm in Teaching 16 LAW, MED. & HRALTH CARE 183, 183-84 (1988).
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clients' position for settlement. He did not have a theory of the re-
sponsibility of individuals for the institutional arrangements in which
they operated. Most significant, Gray did not consider whether his
role as general counsel to the Tuskegee Institute might have blinded
him to a theory of organizational responsibility for the harm to his
clients.7" His theory of the role of race is perhaps understandable in
our post-1960s optimism, in which courts are the primary public pol-
icy makers on racial matters.72
Lawyers who were crafting settlements and drafting legislation in
the aftermath of the public outrage over the Tuskegee Study might
have operated without a conception of the relationship of law to the
institutions of modem science and medicine. 71 Such an institutional
conception is all the more necessary today, when modem medical re-
search, particularly in its quest for the genetic understanding of
health and disease, has heightened the ability of professionals to "play
the God Game" because of patients' faith in medical progress. 4
The Tuskegee Study raises questions beyond the obvious ethical
impropriety of not obtaining informed consent for a study involving
human subjects. That is, we need to consider whether the medical
and legal professionals involved in the Study were in fact "good" indi-
viduals who were unable to see that they practiced under "bad" institu-
tional arrangements. We must refocus on the Tuskegee Study to learn
how legal encounters with human experimentation can help us to de-
vise the best institutional arrangements between law, medicine, and
modern science.
II. THE REGULATORY MODEL
A. Cost-Benefit Analysis Under the National Research Act
Another legal legacy of the Tuskegee Study is legislative. After
Senate hearings on the Study, Congress passed the National Research
71. SeeJONES, supra note 2, at 216.
72. The Supreme Court's approval of the executive branch's detention of people of
Japanese ancestry during World War II might have made Gray a little less optimistic about
the Court's ability to remedy the political effects of racial prejudice. See Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); see also KOMESAR, supra note 38, at 202-03 (suggesting in
his critique of the World War II race cases that courts were unable or unwilling to stop the
executive branch from interning).
73. See Larry I. Palmer, Life, Death, and Public Policy, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 161 (1995)
(reviewing KoMESAR, supra note 38).
74. See RoT mAN, supra note 15, at 247-62 (discussing the relationship between the
regulation of medical research and patient trust in physicians and hospitals); see also KArZ,
supra note 23, at 185-91 (discussing the authoritative status and high degree of autonomy
accorded to professionals in a technologically advanced society).
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Act of 1974. 75 The Act left two clear, permanent marks on the na-
tional discourse regarding the use of human subjects. First, and most
significant, the Act authorized the United States Department of
Health, Education and Welfare to issue regulations governing feder-
ally funded research. 76 The pillar of this regulatory system was the
institutional review board and its supposed capacity to supervise the
giving of consent.77 Under this system, the members of the institu-
tional review board would assist the investigator in her cost-benefit
analysis to determine whether the use of human subjects was appro-
priate.7' Without this institutional assurance, federal funds for the
proposed research would be denied.79 Current regulations governing
federally sponsored research evolved from the authority granted
under the Act.8 0
The second feature of the Act was the establishment of the Na-
tional Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects, designed to
advise Congress and the executive about policies regarding the use of
human subjects.8 ' Although the Commission's mandate has ex-
pired,"2 similar groups have become a feature of our national political
life.8" "Commissioning Ethics" became a political compromise be-
tween those who sought specific legal restrictions on physicians' and
scientists' use of human subjects and those who opposed such
restrictions.
B. Adjudication After Political Equilibrium
Formation of a multidisciplinary group to address a crisis in
human experimentation does not require congressional action. 5 In
75. Pub. L No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 201 to
300aaa-13 (1994)).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 212.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS,
supra note 20, at 108. The regulations cover research sponsored by federal agencies and
research at institutions receiving federal grant support. See id. Thus, all university-spon-
sored research is covered by these regulations. See id. Research performed by private com-
panies not receiving government support is not necessarily covered by the regulations. See
id. Similarly, the regulations do not govern research conducted by United States citizens
outside of the United States. See id.
81. 42 U.S.C. §§ 201-211.
82. See H.R. REP. No. 102478, at 66 (1992). The Commission was established by Con-
gress in 1974 and went out of existence in 1978. See id.
83. See id. at 67-100.
84. See RoTHMAN, supra note 15, at 168-89.
85. See id. at 189.
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January 1994, following numerous media reports of secret govern-
ment experiments, President Clinton issued an executive order estab-
lishing the most recent Advisory Committee on Human Radiation.86
When President Clinton announced in October 1995 that he had re-
ceived the Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Ex-
periments,87 we learned officially8 of other government-sponsored
research involving patients and research subjects. The Committee's
Report chronicled the fifty-year history of experiments on the effects
of human radiation, and like previous government reports on human
experiments, it recommended that the government pay the individu-
als who were unknowing participants in government-sponsored scien-
tific experiments.8 9 This payment would not be for the physical harm
caused by the experiment, but rather for the "indignity" of being ex-
perimented upon without consent.9 ° In effect, the Committee asked
itself: "Should we compensate those who suffer for medical progress?"
and answered the question with a resounding, if somewhat lengthy:
"Yes."
I have no objection to Congress's enacting legislation to provide
financial compensation to some of the subjects of government-spon-
sored human radiation experiments. Government compensation,
however, should not be a complete bar to individual recovery. Polit-
ical solutions, ultimately, are compromises in any sense, but we should
recognize the imperfections of previous political solutions, such as the
National Research Act of 1974. 1 In a separate individual statement,
one member of the Radiation Advisory Committee, Jay Katz, who was
also a member of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study Ad Hoc Study Panel,
expressed his disappointment with the failure to develop a national
policy on the use of human subjects.92 Katz's doubts about the capac-
ity of institutional review boards within research organizations to re-
86. See Kenneth R. Feinberg, Radiation and Responsibility, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 1995, at
A23, available in 1995 WL 9267889.
87. FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON HuMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS,
supra note 20.
88. The information about the alleged radiation experiments had been known for
some time, but there was no official government recognition of how widespread the prac-
tice might have been. Id. at 502-04. Congress compensated some of the individuals in-
volved in radiation experiments sponsored by the CIA. Id. at 513-14.
89. Id. at 512.
90. Id. at 512-13. The Commission's Report contains recommendations ranging from
issues of record keeping on human experimentation to providing Congress and the execu-
tive access to information on special actions. Id. at 512-40.
91. Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 201 to
300aaa-13 (1994)).
92. See Statement by Committee MemberJay Katz, FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COM-
MrrrEE ON HuMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, supra note 20, at 547.
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solve policy conflicts is symptomatic of a larger societal problem.93
The political equilibrium94 we have achieved on human experimenta-
tion is fragile and subject to disruption by public events, such as the
media report of secret government radiation experiments. 9 5
Although revelations of past human experimentation may bring me-
dia attention and congressional hearings, they do not necessarily pro-
duce new legislation or court opinions that change the present
structure. Legislation enacted in the aftermath of the Radiation Advi-
sory Committee's Report should leave open the possibility of individ-
ual lawsuits.
The litigation surrounding the radiation experiments at the Uni-
versity of Cincinnati General Hospital warrants close attention be-
cause it tells a story about modern human subject research.96 First,
although it has been known for some time that radiation experiments
took place for many years at Cincinnati General Hospital, until re-
cently the identities of the patients were not known.97 One might as-
sume that the connection of these experiments to military efforts and
professional notions of confidentiality may have cloaked the subjects'
93. See id.
94. The phrase "political equilibrium" is borrowed from William N. Eskridge, Jr. and
Philip P. Frickey. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (1988); William N. Es-
kridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law As Equilibrium, 108 HARv. L. REV. 27 (1994)
[hereinafter Law As Equilibrium].
95. Cf. Eskridge & Frickey, Law As Equilibrium, supra note 94 (discussing the disruption
of political equilibrium by events such as war and controversial Supreme Court decisions).
96. See In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796 (S.D. Ohio 1995). In these
studies, which were conducted at Cincinnati's General Hospital from 1960 to 1972:
[R]esearchers from the University of Cincinnati College of Medicine exposed 87
mostly poor, African-American cancer patients to whole-body radiation with up to
300 rads for roughly an hour-the equivalent of 20,000 chest X rays and enough
to cause more than half the patients to experience nausea, vomiting, abdominal
pain, and mental confusion. Documents show that the study, funded in part by
the Department of Defense, was designed to estimate how effective soldiers could
be after an atomic bomb explosion.
Carol Pogash, Chain Reaction, CAL. LAw., Mar. 1995, at 48, 50-51.
At the time of publication of this Essay, the parties in the Cincinnati Radiation Litigation
were considering a proposed settlement in the class action suit. See Tim Bonfield, Holdouts
Call Deal Far from Adequate, CIN. ENQUIRER, Feb. 22, 1997, at B1, available in 1997 WL
5438066. The proposed settlement involved giving $33,000 to $66,000 to each family. See
id. The children of three of the radiation experiment subjects opposed the settlement. See
id.
97. See In re Cincinnati Radiation, 874 F. Supp. at 804. The complaint alleged that until
a newspaper reporter revealed the names of some of the subjects in January 1994, the
plaintiffs' counsel had no way of knowing whether their representatives had been subjects
in radiation experiments. See id.
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identities in a veil of secrecy. Clearly, medicine's connection with the
military war efforts skewed the "ethics" of physicians.9"
Second, most of these subjects were "poor," some were charity
cases, and most were African American.9 There is some similarity be-
tween the legal theories used by the plaintiffs in the Cincinnati lawsuit
and the complaint filed after the Tuskegee Study in that they both
alleged violations of constitutional rights.'
The trial judge in In re Cincinnati Radiation Litigation'0 ' denied
the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint.'0 I wonder, how-
ever, if the trial judge who refused to dismiss the complaints brought
on behalf of the deceased, indigent, and mostly African-American pa-
tients might have been motivated by another feature of modem
medicine-the tendency to forget its harms or its failures. Those who
died from cancer twenty years ago at the University of Cincinnati Hos-
pital, ' for instance, are of little historical interest because we believe
that they would have died regardless of our actions, 0 4 and because we
claim to have learned lessons from our mistakes that will benefit fu-
ture patients.
One wonders if society has become so accustomed to human re-
search that it has accepted a view of medical progress grounded in
notions of "cure" and "death." Given the advances of biomedical re-
search, it is hard to imagine that there is harm and suffering that has
been hidden from public view, such as in the Tuskegee and Human
Radiation Studies. Perhaps individual lawsuits by actual victims are
reminders that the harms of modern scientific medicine are not al-
98. See, e.g., TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 (1948) (demonstrating the most infamous example
of this-the war crimes trial brought against Nazi doctors who conducted experiments
upon concentration camp inmates against their will); see also KATz, supra note 23, at 292-
306 (providing excerpts from record of war crimes trials in which Nazi physicians were
prosecuted for conducting medical experiments without subjects' consent). There is now
growing evidence that the key expert on medical ethics for the United States "skewed" the
facts about experiments on prisoners in the United States during World War II. SeeJon M.
Harkness, Nuremberg and the Issue of Wartime Experiments on LS Prisoners, 276 JAMA 1672
(1996).
99. See Plaintiffs Complaint at 8, 10-11, Pollard v. United States, 384 F. Supp. 304
(M.D. Ala. 1974) (No. 4126-N).
100. See In re Cincinnati Radiation, 874 F. Supp. at 804. Plaintiffs alleged violations of
their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See id. There are also differ-
ences between the cases in that In re Cincinnati Radiation alleged specific common law
claims and claims based on federal statutes. See id. at 805.
101. 874 F. Supp. 796 (S.D. Ohio 1995).
102. Id. at 807.
103. Id. at 800-01.
104. SeeJoNES, supra note 2, at 207 (applying this theory to the Tuskegee Study).
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ways immediately visible. Sometimes the harm from powerful and
otherwise beneficial drugs is intergenerational; the litigation over di-
ethylstilbestrol (DES) is one such example. 10 5 At other times, the so-
cial context of medicine does not allow individual physicians and
scientists to see individual harm, as in both the Tuskegee and Human
Radiation examples. 106 For instance, determining whether radical
surgery for certain cancers is more beneficial than the alternatives re-
quires years of longitudinal studies.
We should explore the relevant competence of adjudicative, legis-
lative, administrative, and market processes to deal with the problem
of human experimentation. 1 7 Market forces-medicine, science,
and how individuals respond to them-are the predominant forces
that shape whether investigators view the risks to human subjects as
worth taking.'08 Administrative or legislative responses to problems of
human experimentation are likely to be dominated by the forces of
medicine and science as illustrated by the National Research Act of
1974.109 Thus, judicial decisionmaking in human experimentation
should aim to shape the institutional processes of medicine and sci-
ence by recognizing its own limitations. An individual lawsuit such as
In re Cincinnati Radiation gives only a skewed distribution of the possi-
ble harms and benefits of atomic research."1 The regulatory
processes developed over the past twenty years to deal with human
experimentation might actually have increased the amount of human
experimentation, as well as the growth of new cures and greater life
expectancy. There is also the concomitant growth in the possibility
for individual pain and suffering. Perhaps nothing so blatantly shock-
ing as the Tuskegee Study would happen now, but other such events
105. See, e.g., Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988) (alleging plaintiffs suf-
fered in utero injury from their mothers' use of DES); Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 570 N.E.2d
198 (N.Y. 1991) (alleging plaintiff suffered injury as the grandchild of a woman who had
used DES).
106. See generally George J. Annas, Questioning for Grails: Duplicity, Betrayal and Self-Decep-
tion in Postmodern Medical Research, 12J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 297 (1996) (explor-
ing the evolution of rationales used by physicians to justify experimentation on their
patients).
107. See generally Nestor M. Davidson, Constitutional Mass Torts: Sovereign Immunity and the
Human Radiation Experiments, 96 COLUM. L. Rxv. 1203 (1996) (discussing the Human Radi-
ation Experiments as an example of a type of constitutional mass tort for which judicial
abrogation of sovereign immunity is appropriate).
108. See Palmer, supra note 73, at 175.
109. See FINAL REPORT OF THE ADisoav COMMrrrEE ON HuMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS,
supra note 20, at 543.
110. See KoMEsAR, supra note 38, at 177-95.
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are happening and will again happen.' This is why institutional
analysis is so critical.
It is difficult to judge the effects of the post-Tuskegee regulatory
scheme. I do not believe that the problem is seen as determining the
optimal amount of human experimentation. Neither legislative nor
adjudicative processes are very good at determining how much
human experimentation is socially desirable, although each might of-
fer some incentives or disincentives towards optimization. Despite the
reports on human experimentation, we have not yet developed an ad-
equate institutional analysis of human experimentation because our
quest has been a search for bad professionals rather than bad institu-
tional arrangements. The search for bad professionals is perhaps a
job for the legislature, if it would ever consider imposing criminal
sanctions for certain types of human experiments." 2 It is unlikely
that criminal sanctions are going to be enacted in this country, as we
are all so dependent upon physicians."' The hope is that law will
create incentives for modem physicians to see themselves as institu-
tionally embedded. Were physicians to see themselves as so embed-
ded, their educational system would offer them opportunities to
explore the ethical nexus between law, medicine, and science as they
constantly revisit the challenges of modem medicine, including the
effect of the changing social and economic context.1 14
111. See generally Leonard W. Schroeter, Human Experimentation, the Hanford Nuclear Site,
and Judgment at Nuremberg, 31 GONZ. L. REv. 147 (1995-1996) (discussing the development
of law regarding human radiation experimentation).
112. The "crime against humanity" from the Nuremberg trial, for instance, has never
been enacted into domestic law. Furthermore, in the few instances in which prosecutors
have tried to use existing homicide statutes to question physicians' actions regarding pa-
tients, courts have established high barriers to criminal liability. See, e.g., Barber v. Superior
Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 488-89 (Ct. App. 1983) (expressing the court's disappointment
with the legislature's inaction to provide a proper framework for deciding ethical medical
issues); see also PALMER, supra note 15, at 99-107 (discussing the recent unsuccessful at-
tempts in California to prosecute criminally physicians for removing a life-support system
from a critically ill patient).
113. See KArz, supra note 15, at 209 (explaining the intense bonds that patients unilater-
ally form with their doctors).
114. See PALMER, supra note 15, at 42-43. Ten years ago, the hospital was the most impor-
tant organizational structure for physician practice. See id. at 42. Most people, even mem-
bers of the medical community, considered hospitals as simply places where doctors
treated patients. See id. With greater recognition of the role of the hospital as a forum for
research came safeguards against the moral risks inherent in human research. See id. at 43.
With the advent of managed care, the social and economic structure of medicine is under-
going radical change that requires a rethinking of the traditional model of patient consent
as the ethical imperative of modern practice.
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CONCLUSION
Despite being battered by revelations of secret, government-spon-
sored human experiments, we continue the marriage of science and
medicine without examining whether, within our faith in the present
paradigm, there are dangers to ourselves and our loved ones that
should be faced through appropriate legal response. When con-
fronted with abuses in the human experimentation process, legally
trained individuals have asked: "Should we compensate?" As this Es-
say suggests, that may not be the correct question for developing mar-
ginally better social responses.
The response to the Tuskegee Syphilis Study demonstrates that
the core public policy issue that Congress, courts, and institutions of
higher education will have to address is the relationship between sci-
ence and medicine. The questions that must be asked about the
human experimentation process must be different from those posed
by the Committee on Radiation and its predecessor commissions.
Regardless of whether Congress and the various federal agencies
respond effectively to the Radiation Committee's recommendations,
at least one lawsuit will serve as a means of portraying this tragic part
of our history. Whatever damages might be awarded through adjudi-
cation or settlement, we should resist our institutional biases as legally
trained persons to be satisfied with paying for human suffering." 5 We
need thorough institutional analyses of law, medicine, and science so
that law can minimize the amount of human suffering that comes in
the name of medical progress."l 6
Lurking in the shadow of our current paradigm of paying victims
for their unknowing conversion into research subjects is the idea that
money should at some point overcome our moral revulsion to using
individuals as instruments of progress. The idea is shameful on a
number of counts and is not an ethos that we wish to leave as our legal
legacy. Put in these terms, it should make us think of the real prob-
lem with the concept of paying for suffering: pain and suffering are
not quantifiable and are not comparable among individuals. On what
basis, then, can these victims' suffering ever be given monetary value?
It might well be that paying the victims, as we continue to do, perpetu-
ates the cycle of loving people because they are susceptible to
kindness.
115. The pain and suffering metaphor from tort law is having more influence in the
physician-assisted suicide debate. Physicians have started to discuss their obligation to fight
against pain just as they once argued that they should fight against death. See Palmer, supra
note 73, at 169.
116. See KOMESAR, supra note 38, at 53-97.
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